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from the control of those who were in charge of 
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necessary procedural steps. 
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to iu section 580 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure that relief in a default case cannot exceed that 
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affected a default and the out 
that the decision 1vould sanction a trap if it held that his 
had been of since he would properly 
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of honest.v that new company is solvent and may 
avail itself of the statutory provisions to mutualiza-
tion? I defy anyone to give an affirmative answer to this 
question. 
PnESENT PnocEEDING 
Purporting to act under paragraph 20 of the rehabili-
tation and reinsurance agreement, a plan of mutualization 
was formulated by the committee and, on September 22, 1950, 
the iusurance commissioner found that the plan protected the 
rights and interests of new company, its policyholders and 
shareholders, and that he was satisfied that the plan would 
be fair and equitable in its operation. 
Paragraph 20(a) of the rehabilitation and reinsurance 
agreement provides : 
"Mutualization and Disposition of Stock of New Company 
"(2) Neither the Conservator, nor, if one be appointed, 
the Liquidator, of the Old Company, shall dispose of any of 
the stock of the New Company except as follows: 
"(a) At any time between July 1, 1946 and January 1, 
1948, and thereafter so long as the Conservator or a Ijiquidator 
of the Old Company may continue to hold any or all of said 
stock, ten percent (10%) of the holders of participating 
policies of life insurance entitled to vote at a policy holders' 
election on a proposal for voluntary mutualization of the New 
Company, whether those re-insured hereunder or those issued 
by the New Company (each policy holder for this purpose 
being reg·arded as one person regardless of the number of 
policies owned or amount of insurance held) may request 
the New Company to create an Appointing Committee as 
hereinafter provided to exercise the duties and functions here-
inafter specified in respect of a proposed volttntary mutuali-
zation of the New Company, in accordance with the laws of 
the State of California in effect at the time of said request, 
or, if said laws then so permit, of any one or more depart-
ments thereof. Such request shall specify the department or 
departments of the New Company desired to be mutualized. 
"Upon the receipt of such request the New Company shall 
create an Appointing· Committee consisting of the then Pres-
ident of the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, the 
President of Leland Stanford Jr. University, and the Provost 
of the University of California at Los Angeles, or persons 
occupying similar positions if their or any of their titles 
shall have been changed. In the event any one or more of 
such persons shall refuse or be unable to act, the remaining 
June PACIFIC JY!uT. LIFE INs. Co. v.l\fcCoNNELL 
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member or members shall fill the vacancy or vacancies thereby 
created their appointment in writing of another person 
or persons of similar position and standing. If all of said 
persons refuse or are unable to act, the Court or any Judge 
thereof on the application of the Commissioner, des-
Committee consisting of three (3) 
po:Sltlton and standing. Said Appointing 
through not less than a majority of its 
shall designate a Price Determination Committee 
of not less than three and not more than five (5) persons 
skilled in matters of insurance company valuation, which 
through not less than a majority thereof, 
shall determine whether in their opinion the proposed volun-
tary mutualization of the New Company, or of the department 
or departments ther~of specified in said request can then be 
practicably accomplished having due regard to the interests 
of all persons interested in the New Company.* If it can 
be determined that such mutualization is not then practicable 
no further steps shall be taken in connection with a possible 
mutualization of the New Company under the provisions of 
this subparagraph until at least six months after the date of 
such determination. If in the opinion of a majority of the 
members of the committee such mutualization is then prac-
ticable, the committee shall determine the proper price to be 
paid upon such mutualization and appropriate terms of pay-
ments thereof ; said determination shall not be made, however, 
prior to January 1, 1947. 
"If, at the date of the appointment of such committee 
the New Company shall have in force Participating Life 
Insurance written subsequent to the effective ~ate of this 
g-r<;entertt in an amount in excess of its Non-Participating 
I1ife Insurance written during the same period, one-half (%) 
of such excess shall, for the purpose of fixing the proper 
to be paid (but for no other purpose) be deemed to be, 
and shall be valued as, Non-Participating Life Insurance. 
If at the time of such appointment, there shall have been 
transferred from the Participating Department in accordance 
with the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 6 
less than ten percent (10%) of the then accrued 
"'~~«"'"" described therein, or if there shall have been trans-
ferred to the Participating Department any working capital 
pursuant to the of subparagraph (c) of said para-
*The statutory scheme relating to insolvent companies is concerned 
with the protection of those interested in the insolvent company. 
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the mutmtlization the comrnissioner 
may fonmdate a plan for the 1n1llualization of such insnre1·." 
(Emphasis added.) 
All proceedings heretofore had in this litigation have been 
as provided for in article 14 relating to insolvent and de-
linquent insurers. The rehabilitation agreement provides for 
mutualization under the statutory scheme set up for solvent 
insurers. The majority opinion states ''The new company is 
solvent and nondelinquent, and there is no sonnet reason \Vhy 
it should be mutualized under the statutes relating to in-
solvent insurers .... Section 1043 relat<•s to insol-
vents], which authorizes the commissioner to enter into re-
habilitation agreements, contains no express limitation on 
·what may be included in them, and srction 1037 [which also 
relates to insolvents] provides that the enumeration of the 
powers of the commissioner shall not be construed as a limita-
tion upon him or upon his right to do such other acts as he 
may deem necessary in connection with the handling of the 
affairs of an insolvent company." (Emphasis added.) Thus 
the majority opinion admits the procedure relating to insol-
vents was the one used and impliedly admits that it is the 
correct procedure. However, in using the code sections re-
lating to insolvents, the author then argues that these sec-
tions place no limitation upon· the commissioner. Section 
1037 provides that the powers and authority of the commis-
sioner in proceedings "under this article" (which relates to 
insolvents) shall not be construed as a limitation on his right 
to act or to do that "which he may deem necessary or ex-
pedient for the accomplishment or in aid of the purpose of 
such proceedings.'' Then, citing section 1043 (relating again 
to insolvents), we are told that the new company was properly 
organized by the commissioner who ''evidently concluded'' 
that the protection of creditors and ''other interested parties'' 
could best be accomplished through the formation of a new 
company ''divorced as far as possible from the control of 
those who were in charge of the old company when it ex-
perienced financial difficulties.'' Then we are told that the 
new company is a separate and distinct entity. \Ve are told 
this without any discussion of the character of new com-
pany, and with only the unreasoned and unsupported dictum 
in Garrison v. Pacific Mtd. L. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 
9-10 [187 P.2d 893], as authority therefor. 
Section 11525 (the procedure followed here) provides for 
'' Atdhorization to mutualize. A solvent domestic incorpo-
.fnnr 1!J:JG] PAcrnc J\IuT La'E hs. Co. 1'. McCOKKEI1L 743 
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rated insurer a paid-in capital represented by out-
shares of r.apital stock and issuing, on a reserve 
basis, nonassessable policies of life insurance or of both life 
and may convert itself into an incorpo-
or life and disability insurer, 
nonassessable policies on a reserve basis. To that 
end it and carry ant a for the acqtlisition 
the shares its capital stock for the benefit 
of its or any class or classes of its policyholders, 
by complying with the requirements of this chapter." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The is thus directly posed as to whether new com-
pany falls 1vithin the elassification of a "solvent" domestic 
incorporated insurer which ''may convert itself into an in-
corporated mutual life insurer" which "may provide and 
carry out a plan for the acquisition of the outstanding shares 
of it:;; capital stock for the benefit of its policyholders." 
CHARACTER OF NEw Co:i\iPANY 
New company ~was organized by the insurance commissioner 
''with a name similar to that of the old company as a cor-
porate agent to assist him in carrying on the business of the 
old company" (Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 
Ca l.2d 807, 824, 825 17 4 P.2d 761]). lt was also said there 
( p. i327) that "'I' he proce<><1ing was had uuder sections 
1010 to 1061 of the Insurance Code which specially deal with 
the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurance companies. 
Those sections set up a comprehensive statutory scheme to 
accomplish those results. The proceeding is not one in which 
another party is prosecuting another party at all. It is 
sim11ly a proceeding in which the state is invoking its power 
over a corporate entity permitted by tbe state to engage in a 
bnsiness vitally affected with the public interest upon con-
dition of continuing compliance with the requirements pro-
Yided by the state. It is not a controversy between private 
parties bnt a proceeding by the state in the interest of the 
public." Sre also Caminctti v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 
22 Cal.2d 77, 82 [13G P.2d 779], where it was hrld that 
"The new company wns the corporate agency of the Insur-
ance Commissioner as conservatm· for the purpose of con-
timl'ing and prcscnving the business of the old rompany." 
(Emphasis added.) 
'rhe commissioner held, either as conservator or later as 
liquidator, the entire capital stock of new company until 
added.) 
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is formulated, as hol<lee of all the IH· vote:-; for the plan. 
'l'h<>n, as eommissimwr, he approves the plan as fair aml equi-
table. \Ve are told by the opinion that ''it mnst be 
assumed that the Legislature realized that the eommissioner 
might be required to pass upon the fairness of a plan in a case 
·where he, aeting as conservator, hacl previously consented to 
mutualization on behalf of the stockholders." Nothing of the 
kind must be assumed. It is obvious from even a casual read-
ing of the eode provisions n'lating to insolYent companies 
(1043 et seq.) and those relating to solvent companies (11525 
et seq.} that the Legislature had not the faintest thought that 
the two v;oulcl be so commingled as they are in this case, or 
that the commissioner would be in a position where he 
was forced to approve a plan to be formulated some 10 years in 
the future, then, when the plan was formulated forced to vote 
an approval of it as a sole stockholder, and still later, to give 
his approval of something he hacl theretofore twice before 
approved. 
Ever since the iuception'B of the receivership proceedings 
and the organization of new company all the parties and 
proceedings concerned in the rehabilitation matter have been 
subject to the continuing jurisdiction and supervision of the 
court. It has been pointed out in various phases of this litiga-
tion that new company was organized by the commissioner as 
his cor·pomte agent to rehabilitate the business of old com-
pany. -without the original proceeding under section 1011 (d) 
of the Insurance Code, new company would not have come 
into being. 
It is necessary, next, to note the difference in methods pro-
vided for in the two diYisions of the Insurance Code for 
mutualization of insolvent and solvent companies. 
Section 1046 provides that ''Said mutualization plan [called 
inYoluntary mutualization for insolvent companies and fol-
lows the section ( 1045) which provides: "If at any time after 
the 1'ssuance of an order ttnder· section 1011" the "commis-
sioner" shall formulate a plan of mutualization] shall include 
provisions for: 
"(a) [Acquisition of capital stock.] The acquisition by 
such insurer of all outstanding shares of its capital stock at a 
price and upon terms and conditions to be fixed as hereinafter 
provided. 
*(With the exception of the present proceeding to be hereinafter 
discussed.) 
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[Retirement of capital stock.] The retirement of 
shares of when acquired by such insurer. 
" [Amendment of The amendment of the 
charter of such insurer so as to enable it to transact its busi-
ness as a mutual insurer nonassessable policies on a 
reserve basis. 
'' [Payment of The manner in which and the 
time within which, after mutualization is matured 
and maturing claims against such insurer shall be paid to the 
lawful holders 
" [Submission of plan to policyholders.] The submis-
sion of said mutualization plan to the policyholders of such 
insurer nuder such procedure as shall be set forth in the plan 
or prescribed by said court, for their approval or rejection. 
"(f) [Notice to shareholders.] Notice to the shareholders 
of such insurer, in such manner and at such time after the 
approval of said mutualization plan by said policyholders, 
as the court may direct." 
Section 1048 provides that after the formulation of the 
mutualization plan, the commissioner shall submit it to the 
court for its order directing the submission thereof to the 
policyholders named in subdivision of section 1046. 
Section 11526 (relating to solvent insurers) provides that 
''Such plan shall include appropriate proceedings for amend-
ing the insurer's articles of incorporation to give effect to the 
acquisition, by said for the benefit of its policyholders 
or any class or classes thereof, of the outstanding shares of 
its capital stock and the conversion of the insurer from a 
stock corporation into a nonstock corporation for the benefit 
of its members. The members of such nonstock corporation 
shall be the policyholders from time to time of the class or 
classes for whose benefit the stock of the insurer was acquired, 
and no other persons. Such plan shall be: 
"(a) Adopted by a vote of a majority of the directors. 
[As distinguished from the formation thereof by the commis-
sioner as provided in section 1045.] 
'' (b) Approved by the vote of the holders of at least a 
majority of the outstanding shares at a special meeting of 
shareholders called for that purpose, or by the written con-
sent of such shareholders. [As distinguished from section 
1048 requiring the connnissioner to obtain court approval 
and an order of the court directing the submission of the plan 
to the policyholders.] 
'' {c) · Submitted to the commissioner and approved by him 

:seetion conm:nssroner 's would then be sub-
mitted to the court for its order directing the submission of 
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the mutualization plan to the shareholders and policyholders 
of the seized insurer for their vote of approval, or disapproval 
as the case might be ( § 1046, subds. (e) and ) . Old com-
pany, not having been dissolved, still exists; new company 
was organized as the corporate agent of the commissioner to 
rehabilitate the business of old company with the assets of 
old company. New company as it appears, be con-
sidered as a completely independent and solvent organization 
under the facts here prevailing. As I have pointed out, the 
commissioner holds the entire beneficial interest in all the 
capital stock of new company for the benefit of stockholders, 
policyholders and creditors of old company; the legal title 
to the stock of new company is held by voting trustees who 
vote it as directed by the commissioner. As I have also 
pointed out, the board of directors of new company are under 
the close supervision, control and direction of the commis-
sioner and must, in reality, take orders from him as to every 
major, and some minor, business details. It cannot be said 
that this close supervision, control and direction exist in the 
usual ''solvent'' corporation. 
CoRPORATE ENTI'l'Y OF NEw CoMPANY 
Respondents argue that the corporate entity of new com-
pany cannot be disregarded so as to· make the proposed 
mutualization a mutualization of old company. In support 
of this contention, In t"e Bond & JJ!Iortg. Gnar. Corp., 157 Misc. 
240 [283 N.Y.S. 623, 652], and Gat·rison v. Paci.fic JJ!ttt. L. Ins. 
Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1, 9-10 [187 P.2d 893], are cited. In 
neither case was mutualization involved. In the Bond & 
Mortgage Guarantee case, the superintendent of insurance had 
organized Bond & JYiortgage Guarantee Corporation ''as a 
domestic insurance corporation, with a capital of $1,000,000, 
a surplus of $2,000,000, and a reserve for contingencies of 
$200,000, all of which was paid out of the assets of the guar-
antee co·mpany in exchange for the entire capital stock of the 
new corporation, 10,000 shares of the par value of $100 each ; 
a certificate for said number of shares was issued in the name 
of the guarantee corn.pany and is held by the superintendent 
of insurance as an asset, for the benefit of the creditors (in-
cluding the policyholders), of the guarantee company." (Em-
phasis added.) The guarantee corporation here involved took 
on the duty of insuring mortgages, "but on a restricted basis 
under a limited policy of guaranty." (Pp. 641, 650.) This 
case involved a proceeding whereby the People, and certain 
individuals interested, applied for an order enjoining the 
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Statr Commission from demanding and receiving 
or assuming control of certain mortgages being serviced by 
the guarantee pursuant to court order. The in-
junction was granted. The contention was that the guarantee 
corporation, in servicing mortgages, was acting without ade-
quate corporate powers. The court held that the corporation 
was acting within its and, in ans·wer to the 
contention that the corporation was a state agency 
inseparable from the superintendent of insurance (so as to 
permit another state agency, the ::VIortgage Commission, which 
came into being the proceedings set forth had been 
had) to take it over, the court said: "Said corporation is 
like any other corporation; a distinct entity. All of its stock 
is owned by guarantee company, and the certificate therefor 
is held in the custody of the superintendent; this he holds as 
he does any other assets of the company in rehabilitation, as a 
receiver designated by statute for the benefit of the creditors 
and stockholders of said company; not as an owner, represent-
ing the state. It is a stock corporation. having been created, 
for one thing, with a view to its possible sale for the benefit 
of the creditors, as its exhaustive by-laws make apparent. 
During such time as the stock control remains as it is, the 
operation of the corporation is to be under the supervision of 
the superintendent as rehabilitator." (Emphasis added.) 
The court continued and said that the primary management 
of the corporation was with the board of directors, although it 
was subject to the supervision of the superintendent "in 
his capacity as supervisor of insurance companies" (pp. 651, 
652). The situation presented in the New York case and 
that presented in the case at bar are factually similar up to 
a point. I have heretofore quoted extensively from Caminett1: 
v. Paoific 21Iut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 344, at page 356 [139 
P.2d 908], wherein we set forth the extensive and minute 
supervision exercised by the commissioner over new com-
pany. 'rhis supervision exceeded by far anything required 
of him as ''supervisor of insurance companies.'' We also 
said in Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 307, 
324, 325 [74 P.2d 761], that new company was organized 
"as a corporate agent to assist him [commissioner] in carry-
ing on the business of the old company." (See also Caminetti 
v. Pacific Mnt. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 77, 80 [136 P.2d 779] .) 
In Garrison v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 1 
[ 187 P .2d 893], the court said, "The question for decision 
is whether an insurance company which was organized to 

agency 
does not ~v,.,~v''""·' 
old company. In 
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in that of the Insurance Code relating to involuntary 
mutualization of insolvent companies. The stock of new com-
pany, held now by voting trustees, with beneficial ownership 
in the commissioner is still held by him for the benefit of 
the policyholders and creditors of old company. This fact 
cannot be ; nor can the rights of the policyholders 
and creditors of old company be disregarded. In holding 
that new company is "utterly distinct" from old company 
for aU purposes, a majority of this conrt chooses to forget 
all the facts concerning this litigation and pretends that new 
company >vas organized as any other insurance company with 
its own assets and liabilities, that the insurance commissioner 
had only the normal, nominal, supervision over its affairs, and 
that no insolvency proceedings had ever been involved. In 
the light of the record before us, such a holding cannot 
stand the test of honest scrutiny. 
REs JuDICATA 
Respondents argue that it has been decided by the superior 
court that the commissioner had authority to include in a 
rehabilitation agreement an option to mutualize the new com-
pany by voluntary proceedings and to agree to dispose of the 
stock of new company at the price, and on the terms, fixed 
by the price determination committee; and that this court 
has decided that the superior court had jurisdiction to so 
decide and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion 
in approving the rehabilitation agreement. 
In the commissioner's answering brief (p. 61) is found 
this statement: "It is true that no attack seems to have been 
made on the mutualization provisions [of the rehabilitation 
agreement] in any of the appellate proceedings, but the courts 
have taken notice of them in determining various appeals.'' 
Neither this court, nor an appellate court, has been concerned 
in any of this litigation with the mutualization provisions of 
the rehabilitation agreement as will hereinafter appear. 
In Carpente1· v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co., 10 CaL2d 307, 
322 [74 P.2d 761], we said that the plan of rehabilitation 
provided for "Ultimate mutualization, in the event the policy-
holders so elect.'' \lv e were there concerned in the main with 
the organization of new company as the corporate agent of 
the commissioner to rehabilitate the business of old company. 
In Carpenter v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co., 13 Cal.2d 306 [89 
P .2d 637], we were concerned with the validity of the "Order 
for Liquidation'' and the mutualization provisions of the plan 
were not considered. In Carpenter v. Pacific JJ1ut. L. Ins. Co., 
,J lllle PACIFIC l\IcT. LIVE T;\;;-;. Co. 1'. i\TcCo;,;:'\r:LL 
144 C.2d 715: 285 P.2d G3G I 
14 Ca1.2d 704 I DG l'.2d 7!!G], In' wen, c·ow·erncd with an 
order of the trial conrt correcting its nunc pro tnnc. 
In Caminefti v. Pacific ;1Jut. L. Tns. 22 Ca1.2(l 77 [l:lG 
P.2d 77D], ·we W<,re concenwd with the claims of 
policyholders and, once again, the mutualization provisions 
were not considered. In Caminctti v. Pacific lJlnt. L. Ins. 
22 Ca1.2d 3;):\ [139 P.2d HOS j, we were eoncemed with 
the propriety of creating a voting trust with the• stock of 
new company under the provisions of seetiou 10:37, subdivision 
(e), of the Tnsuranec Code. \Ve sai<l there that "To adopt 
the eontention that seetion 1037 was not iniended to 
apply to stoek of an insuranee company organized as a. medium 
thr011gh which relwbilitation of the business of a 
ins1trer was to be accomplished would require 11s to disregard 
the clear language of the statute. Section 1087 specifically 
refers to stock issued to the commissioner 'as conservator or 
as liquidator in connection with a rehabilitation or reinsur-
ance agreement.' " (Emphasis added.) \V c also said there 
(p. 355) that the rehabilitation agreement (Pamgraph 20) 
related to the "ultimate status and ownership of the new com-
pany.'' \Ve then pointed out that subdivision (a) (Paragraph 
20) authorizes the commissioner to dispose of the stock in ac-
cordanee with ''any plan of mntualization thereafter adopted 
by the policyholders of the new eompaHy, and such a dispo-
sition may inelude a transfer to voting trnstcl'S if the plan of 
mutualization so provides.'' \Ve helrl that the voting trust 
agreement was not a disposal of the stoek within the meaning 
or purpose of Paragraph 20 of the rehabilitation agreement 
and we said ( p. 358) that "It is trnce that the words 'dispose 
of' are used in subdiYision (a) of paragraph 20 in connee-
tion with an authorization to the commissioner to transfer 
the stock of the new eompany to voting trustees in aecon1-
anee with a plan of mutualization. But 1·t is clear that undet· 
that s11bdivLsion the transfer there pr·ovidecl for woulrl r·eqnire 
ct complete alienation of the stock in order to carry out the plan 
of mutualization contemplated therein." (Emphasis added.) 
Again, the validity of the mutualization procedure >vas not 
passed upon; the only holding being that the rehabilitation 
agreement did not preelude the creation of the yoting trust. 
[n Caminetti v. Pacific JJ!nt. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2c1 :386 [139 
P.2d H30], we were coneerncd with disqualification of a judge 
and a party's waivrr thereof. Mutualization was not con-
sidered. In Cmm:netti v. Pacific ll:lut. L. Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 
!142 P.2d 741], we were concerned with the correctness of the 
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'fhe are in disagreement as to whether or not the 
mutualization provisions were litigated at the time the order 
of December 4, 1936, was made. The insurance commissioner 
says that '' P1·esumably these provisions did not go entirely 
unchallenged in the proceedings leading up to the Order of 
Hchabilitation." (Emphasis added.) (Insurance commission-
's brief, p. 61.) New company asserts that the 
"validity" of the rehabilitation agreement was put in issue 
an<l decided by the order of December 4, 1936, and that the 
same has been approved by this court. From all that appears, 
it is obvious that the preeise question here involved has never 
been passed upon. It most eertainly has not been passed upon 
by an appellate eourt, or by this eourt. Hespondent, new eom-
pany, points to the following quotations from the pleadings 
in the original proeeeding as showing that the mutualization 
provisions of paragraph 20 (a) were litigated. ''.Answer of 
Certain Interveners to Petition for Approval of Second Pro-
posed Hehabilitation and Reinsurance Agreement, Folios 2757-
2759 of Transcript on Appeal. L.A. 16182: 
'' 'fhat said plan, if exeeuted, would be entirely void and of 
no effeet, and would not be binding upon the partie!'l thereto, 
and that the execution of the same is beyond the authority 
of the said Samuel L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insuranee Commis-
sioner of the State of California and as Conservator of The 
Pacifie Mutual Life Insurance Company of California [old 
eompany], and that the execution of said agreement and the 
transfer of the assets by the said Insurance Commissioner is 
wholly unauthorized by the Insurance Code of the state of 
California and is entirely beyond the power of the said Samuel 
L. Carpenter, Jr., as Insurance Commissioner and as Con-
servator as aforrsaid, and the said agreement will be void 
when executed and beyond the power of the Insurance Com-
missioner under the statute in such cases made and provided 
and that the said agreement is of no binding effect whatever 
on any of the parties thereto and that any acts done pursuant 
thereto are wholly null and void.'' 
''.Amended Complaint in Intervention of Certain Inter-
venors, Folio 3882 of Transcript on .Appeal, L.A. 16182: 
''That the approval of said agreement is beyond the au-
thority and jurisdiction of this court and, if given, would 
be void and of no force and effect, for the reason that authority 
therefor is not given in, and, in fact, is forbidden by, the 
terms and provisions of said Insurance Code of California, 
and, in particular, of articles is [sic] and 14 of chapter 1 of 
part 2 of division 1 thereof.'' 
.Juuc 1~)Gi)] PACIFIC :VIFT. J,IFE b::-;. Co. l'. 1\IcCo~:\'ELL /;)!) 
144 C.2d 715; 285 P.2d 636] 
It appears to me that whu t was 
these pleadings was that the 
was said to be beyond the commissioner's power siuee that 
yras the major issue in Car-penter· v. Pacific Mnt. L. Ins. Co., 
10 Cal.2d 307 [74 P.2d 761]. 
The next question that arises is whether or not the pro-
visions for mutualization could have been in that 
proceeding inasmuch as mutualization was not to take place 
until between 1946 and 1948, or ''so long as the Conservator 
or a Liquidator of the Old Company may continue to llold any 
or all of said stock .... " (Paragraph 20 (a), rehabilitation 
agreement.) The proposed voluntary mutualization plan was 
also to be in accordance "with the laws of the State of Cali-
fornia in effect at the time of said request. . . . '' The plan 
was also not to be proposed unless the price determination 
committeee ''shall determine whether in their opinion the 
proposed voluntary mutualization of the New Company ... 
can then be practicably accomplished .... " In Silva v. 
City & County of San Fr-ancisco, 87 Cal.App.2d 784 [198 
P.2d 78], a county board of supervisors passed a resolution 
that certain land of plaintiff's should be acquired when neces-
sary. Plaintiff sued for a declaration as to the value of his 
property. ']'he court, in refusing to place plaintiff's valuation 
on the property, declared: ''The court may take judicial 
knowledg·e that real estate values do not remain constant. 
The value fixed during the present period may be dispropor-
tionate to what should be paid when the recreation depart-
ment of the city decides to use the property as part of a 
'playground.' Plaintiff seeks a final determination that the 
property is worth $10,000 and that if and when defendant 
thooses to take the property this will be the amount it must 
pay." (Emphasis that of tllc court.) It was also said that 
'' ... the present complaint alleges in substance that the 
value of the property may be determined through condemna-
tion proceedings when defendant deems it 'necessary.' The 
only deelaratory judgment that could be rendered under the 
allegations of the complaint would be of an advisory nature-
namely, that when defendant deems it necessary to institute 
condemnation proceedings the price be fixed at the then 
market value." (Pp. 788-789.) 
In Young v. Young, 100 Cal.App.2d 85, 87 [223 P.2d 25], 
it was held that an action to establish a foreign decree of 
divorce in California, and for ratification by the California 
eourt of a property settlement included in the foreign de-
or 
'then 
the that the statute or charter 
be evaded and set at naught. The 





at the time it enterrd its 
the commissioner. out that to so interpret the order 
of section 1037, subdivision 
securing to all interested 
. '' Appellants have not 
'' in its true sense. 
contend that the order of the com-
the of mutualization was subject to 
the superior court. It is argued that 
the commissioner, in his order, acted in a judicial 
capacity rather than in an administrative or legislative capac-
ity as contended by Appellants contend that in 
reviewing a decision or order of a statewide administrative 
agency or of a state officer, the superior court must reweigh 
the evidence and determine for itself according to its inde-
pendent judgment whether or not the decision is supported 
by the weight or preponderance of the evidence in every case 
where state judicial functions are involved. They rely upon 
Thomas v. Stab. Corn., 39 Cal.2d 501, 504 
[247 P.2d 561] ; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 
Cal.2d 301, 308 [196 P.2d 20] ; Laisne v. California State Board 
of Optometry, 19 Ca1.2d 834-835 [123 P.2d 457] ; and 
Drummey v. State Board Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 
13 Cal.2d 75 P.2d Respondents, on the other hand, 
argne that the commissioner's order was an exercise of execu-
tive pmver and >vas not the exercise of such full judicial 
power as to entitle appellants to have the trial court exercise 
its independent judgment ·with respect to the weight of the 
evidence. I\espondents rely upon the cases of Bank of Ita~y 
v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1 [251 P. 7841; Doble Steam 1~1otors 
Corp. v. Dcmghc-1·ty, 195 Cal. 158 [232 P. 140]; JJfcDonmtgh 
v. Goodcell, ]3 Cal.2d 741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], 
and Southern Jockey Cl11.b, Inc. v. California etc. Racing 
Board, 36 Cal.2d 167 [223 P .2d 1]. 
The duties of the commissioner, as set forth in section 
12921 l1ave been held to be "that of a minister of the court 
tween lit but he nets as 
evrr to judicial 
of power or 
ease, 
N~ivcr of the assets of insurance 
he clid not derive his power from 
statute. 
eomm1sswner as a re-
and slat<:rl that 
but from the 
'fhe distinetion in the two lines of eases relied npon by 
appellants and respondents is that m those relied upon by 
appellants an vested was extingnished, 
or taken away, by the ll(tministrati'I'C order. For example, 
in the Drumme.v ease (12 Cal.2d and \Yilson 
had bee11 duly lieensrc1 embalmers and the State Board of 
Funeral Directors and Embalmers ordered their licenses sus-
pemled. 'fhis eonrt held that it IYWl with a statute 
whirh conferred certain faet-finding powers on a board rxer-
eising statewide jurisdiction and that there ':ras no "indica-
tion that the legislature iutended the l'aets so found to be 
binding on the conrts'': that no method of review was pro-
vided in the statute. \Ye held that \Ye could see no escape 
from the conclusion that in such a the court to 
·which the application for wandate is made mnst ·weigh the 
evide1Jce, and exerei:w its on the facts 
as \Yell as the law, if the 
his constitutional rights under thr state and fed ern l Constitu-
tions. "The state constitutional disenssrd, supra, 
prohibits the confrrring of judicial pmwr on such administra-
tiYe boards" (p. 84). 
In Loisne v. California Slate Board supra, 
tltr California State Boanl of Optometry had revoked r_,aisne 's 
eertificate of registration to practice in this state. 
\V(• held there tJ1at "Oll ihe authority of the Drummey case 
the onl.v type of review that would afford appellant his full 
eonstitutional rights would be a trial de noyo as 
ontlined in the d('Cision in that ease." (P. 843.) 




the benefit of the and stockholders of 
old company ( Caminetti v. Paeijic Mut. L. Ins. Co., 22 Cal.2d 

power on such administra-
Co. v. United 298 U.S. 
, the court stated: ''Legis-
qualifications, work in a field 
demands. Some may be expert 
subservient. It is not difficult for 
of law in a hearing 
to say that their findings of 
fact may be made eollC:lusive 1Dhcrc constitutional rights of 
although the evidence are 
clearly establishes that the are wrong and constitu-
tional have been i11 is to place those rights at 
the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair 
the inherent iu our safeguards. That pros-
of administrative agencies, is 
It is said that we can retain 
rxamine the \Yeight of evidence when 
concerns the right of prrsonal liberty. But if 
this be so, it is not because we are privileged to perform our 
judicial in that case and for reasons of convenience to 
disregard it in others. 1'he applies when rights 
e1~ther of persons or property are protected by constitu-
tional restrictions. lTnder our system there is no warrant for 
the view that the power of a competent court can 
be circumscribed any legislative arrangement designed to 
give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits 
of constitutional " (Emphasis added.) This case 
and this statement were relied upon by us in the Drummey 
case 13 Cal.2d 85) and no information has been 
presented to me to show that the rule there set forth has 
been in any way No clearer case than this could 
possibly be found to illustrate the evils to be avoided. Old 
eompany stockholders and policyholders have been, and are, 
at the "mercy" of administrative officials; those officials may, 
during the last 10 years, have been either ''expert and im-
partial'' or ''subservient.'' 
I have heretofore set forth at length the self-evident fact 
that appellants are of vested property rights of 
which they are being deprived. In Ohio Valley Water Co. v. 
Ben Avon Bonmgh, 253 U.S. 287, 289 [40 S.Ct. 527, 641J.Ed. 
908], it was held: ''The order here involved prescribed a 
complete schedule of maximum future rates and was legisla-
tive in character. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 
.June 19;);)] PACIFIC lVIuT. LIFE hs. Co. 1· 767 
I 44 C2d 6:36] 
U.S. 210 [29 S.Ct. G7, G:; LE\1. . R. 
Co. v. Slate Public Cti!ities ConL, 
345, Gi3 L.Bd. In all r:;uch ea>WR, if owner claims con-
fiscation his the state rwust a 
opportunity for tri-
bunal determination upon its own 
as to both law and : otherwise the order 
in conflict with the due pnJCess 
~Jlissouri Pew. Ry. Co. 
961, 57 L.Ed. 1507] ; Wadley Soutlwrn 
235 U.S. 651, 660, 661 [35 S.Ct. hEd. 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 241 538 
60 L.Ed. 1148] ; Okl.aJwnw 
331 [ 40 S.Ct. 338, 64 L.Ed. 
Appellants here complain 
v. Georgia, 




ization plan provides that thr to he paid for new com-
pany's stock (of which they are the owners) is 
$3,000,000 \rhile that sanw amount vms originally taken out 
of old company's fnnc1s to purchase new stock and, 
in addition, all the other assets of old company $200,-
000,000 in assrts plns such as going agency or-
ganization and concern, good ·will, "vmrth several mil-
lions of dollars" [Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co., 10 
Cal.2d 307, 325 (74 P.2d 761)]) were turned over to new com-
pany! It surely must be crystal clear to everyone who can 
think that such an outrageous confiscation of property with-
out due process of law has never before taken place in this 
state. 
EVIDENCE 
In the trial court the evidence consisted of all of the record 
of the proceedings before the insurance commissioner, con-
sisting of the reporter's daily the exhibits and 
the commissioner's decision. Appellants contend that they 
were prohibited from introducing or offering to 
do so, because of the rulings of the trial court ; that no issues 
of fact were litigated; that the court ruled that it was not 
empowered to exercise its independent judgment on the evi-
dence taken before the commissioner. Respondents state that 
appellants were given leave to serve and file a motion and 
affidavits relative to the introduction of additional evidence 
and failed to do so. 'l'he memorandum opinion and order 
(,July 2, 1951, Olk Tr., 237-239) contains this statement: 
''After a careful study of the briefs submitted and the au-
eonclusion to be drawn from 
the facts of this case is that appellants were possessed of a 
holders of t!1P solven1 compan;~~ 
s.-at,•mrnt is formd 
"In m;merous ·where the 
of11eer was YlCeC'SSary fo 1WCI'CIIf 
h1s participation has been 
44 C.2d-25 
scheme, 
althongh the g-rounds for 
C.2d 
scheme'' \Yas mueh. 
carried scheme is 
scheme for rehabilitation of insolvent 
IS 
for mntualizat ion of solYent 
am also of the opinion that 
rehabilitation 
determined 
of the present 
of the interested 
a separability clause in the rehabilitation and that 
nothing heretofore done this, or an appellate court, will 
be affected a holding this court that the parties may 
not yalidly eontract to mutualizP new company contrary to 
the applicable statutory provisions. 
(3) There should have been a trial de novo in the superior 
court where evidence relative to the proper method to be 
used by the price determination committee, or co1u~t-appointed 
appraisers, could have been introdueed both sides and a 
determination made a judicial trier of fact. Both appel-
lants and respondents here devote many pages of their nu-
merous briefs to such material. Such methods are obviously 
matters for experts in the field of insurance and should be 
the of in the trial court. 
If, as I firmly believe, the procedure for involuntary 
mutualization of insolvent companies is the proper procedure, 
sections 1049, 1050, 1051 and 1052 of the Insurance Code 
contain detailed provisions for hearings and the appointment 
by the court of appraisers to appraise ''the then outstanding 
shares of the capital stock of such insurer, without regard to 
any appreciation or depreciation arising out of said mutualiza-
tion plan as so approved or modified. Such appraisement shall 
fix the reasonable value of such shares of capital stock, in-
eluding the goodwill, if any, of such insurer, and shall state 
the value, if any, assigned to such goodwill; and if the 
appraisers shall have found that such insurer has no goodwill, 
such finding shall be stated. Such appraisement, when con-
firmed by said court, shall be final and conclusive." ( § 1051.) 
'l'he use of the involuntary mutualization procedure for an 
insolvent company follows logically from the original pro-
ceeding under sections 1010 and 1011. It should be noted 
that section 1054 (still under the Insolvency and Delinquency 
,June PACIFIC lYhTT. LIFE I :-iS. Co. McCo"'xEr~rJ 771 
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that: 
shall be a contimwt1:on 





shall exercise all the 
classes of insuranee written 
to 
m u tualiza ti on 
Mnt. L. Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 
307, 334 P.2d 761], that "reinsurance" was a contract 
which one company takes over the in-
surance risks of another company (old and becomes 
substituted as an insurer in the place and stead of the original 
insurer. 'l'his holding is also the result of following 
the outlined in the and Delinquency 
division of the Insuranee Code. 
F'rom what Mr. ,Jnstice Traynor has said in his dissent 
and for the reasons heretofore set forth me, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the should be reversed. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the discussion, the 




for a rehearing was denied July 27, 
,J., and Schauer, ,T., were of the 
shmtld be 
